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Towards a right to sustainable energy 
 
Shol Blustein
* 
 
Energy represents the cornerstone of modern life.  However, current patterns of 
energy production are unsustainable.  This is true for both the developed and 
developing worlds.  In this context, this paper considers how, from a conceptual 
perspective, the law can contribute to more sustainable patterns of energy production 
can be addressed.  The approach that this paper adopts is to consider two of the most 
important concepts that are relevant to the governance of modern environmental and 
societal challenges: human dignity and sustainable development.  It is within this 
context that this paper contends that the convergence of these concepts provides the 
platform for a novel approach to encourage the sustainable production of energy by 
way of a ‘right to sustainable energy’.  With this in mind, this paper considers the 
forum in which a right to sustainable energy may be developed and outlines the 
content of the proposed right. 
INTRODUCTION 
Energy represents the cornerstone of modern life.  It plays a  
critical role ... in the development process, as access to sustainable modern energy 
services contributes to poverty eradication, saves lives, improves health and helps 
provide for basic human needs ... [T]hese services are essential to social inclusion and 
gender equality.
1
 
Therefore, where there is a limited supply of energy this ‘correlates closely with many 
indicators of poverty, such as poor education, inadequate health care and hardships imposed 
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on women and children’.2  It is for these reasons that it is well established that energy and the 
services that it sustains are ‘critical for achieving sustainable development’.3 
While energy represents a crucial ingredient to sustainable development, current 
patterns of energy supply are unsustainable.
4
  Almost 
[o]ne out of every five people on Earth lives without access to electricity and the 
opportunities it provides for working, learning, or operating a business ... Where 
modern energy services are plentiful, the challenge is different.  Emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases from fossil fuels are contributing to changes in 
the Earth’s climate, to the detriment of those who depend on the planet’s natural 
systems for survival.
5
 
In light of these challenges, this paper considers how, from a conceptual perspective, 
the unsustainable patterns of energy production can be addressed.  Drawing inspiration from 
the statements in the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development
6
 and its 
accompanying Plan of Implementation,
7
 this paper explores how the formal recognition of 
human dignity has laid the groundwork for a sustainable approach to energy production.
8
   
Within this context, this paper contends that the convergence of human dignity and 
sustainable development provides the platform for the creation of a ‘right to sustainable 
energy’.  Such a right can contribute to a more sustainable approach to the production of 
energy. 
Following this introduction, this paper considers the meaning of ‘sustainable 
development’ and ‘human dignity’.  This exercise is intended to be brief.  Its purpose is to 
provide the context for the sections that follow.  This paper then considers the formal 
convergence between human dignity and sustainable development within the context of 
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international environmental law.  This review is concerned principally with the convergence 
that has occurred between these concepts in relation to matters concerning the production of 
energy.  The focus of this section is principally historical, as the most recent developments in 
international environmental law have generally operated to reaffirm – rather than realign – 
the fundamental direction of this discipline.  This paper then considers how a right to 
sustainable energy, which represents the natural evolution of the convergence between human 
dignity and sustainable development, can encourage more sustainable patterns of energy 
production. 
OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
A. Sustainable development 
The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
9
 
adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
10
 in Stockholm in 
1972 represented the emergence of international environmental law.  Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration encapsulated the foundation of international environmental law.  This 
principle affirmed that: 
States have ... the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
11
 
The Stockholm Declaration also contained one of the first statements of the concept of 
sustainable development within the emerging forum of international law (although this term 
did not emerge formally until 1987).  The Stockholm Declaration noted that: 
[f]or the purpose of attaining freedom in the world of nature, man must use 
knowledge to build, in collaboration with nature, a better environment.  To defend 
and improve the human environment for present and future generations has become 
an imperative goal for mankind-a goal to be pursued together with, and in harmony 
with, the established and fundamental goals of peace and of worldwide economic and 
social development.
12
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In essence, the Stockholm Declaration recognised that humans must live in collaboration with 
the environment while pursuing economic and social development.  The effect of this 
statement, and the Stockholm Declaration more generally, was to create an indelible link, 
initially within international environmental law but more recently in transnational and 
national laws, between the pursuit of environmental protection and the concepts of economic 
and social development.
13
 
Following the Stockholm Summit, deliberations at a number of international fora 
contributed to the development of international environmental law and the concept of 
sustainable development.
14
  However, it was not until the publication of the Brundtland 
Report
15
 at the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 that the 
concept of sustainable development came to dominate ‘legal debates in the fields of social 
and economic development and environmental protection’.16  The definition of sustainable 
development offered by the Brundtland Report regarded sustainable development as 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability for future 
generations to meet their own needs’.17  It is this definition that is adopted in this paper. 
The Brundtland Report recognised two critical limitations to the definition of 
sustainable development.  First, ‘overriding priority’18 should be given to the ‘needs, in 
particular the essential needs, of the world’s poor’.19  In other words, sustainable 
development must seek to end the plight of those living in poverty by focussing principally 
on the needs of the world’s most vulnerable.  The reason for the focus on the essential needs 
of the world’s poor was because 
[a] world in which poverty and inequity are endemic will always be prone to 
ecological and other crises.  Sustainable development requires meeting the basic 
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needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better 
life.
20
 
The second limitation to development identified by the Brundtland Report recognised 
that there are environmental limits to the actions that can be taken to further development.  
Development must therefore be limited by the ‘state of technology and social organization on 
the environment's ability to meet present and future needs’.21  Therefore, sustainable 
development seeks to address the inherent tension that exists between social and economic 
development and environmental protection.  It has been noted that such an approach is 
necessary because without it there exists a greater risk that decisions will ‘destabilize 
economic and social conditions’.22 
Considered in its most general sense, sustainable development is therefore ‘constructed 
to frame cooperative, integrated solutions to some of the most significant challenges of our 
era’.23  In this regard, sustainable development is not concerned with a single issue.  Rather, 
its application is determined by the context in which it is considered.  Sustainable 
development therefore represents a dynamic conceptual tool that is concerned with the 
priorities of the day relating to social and economic development and environmental 
preservation.
24
 
Following the publication of the Brundtland Report, the concept of sustainable 
development has been considered in various internationally relevant documents.  Chief 
among these were the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
25
 and the 
2002 Johannesburg Declaration.  Most recently, the 2012 outcome document of Rio+20 – 
The Future We Want – reaffirmed many of the concepts that were considered in the earlier 
documents of the past few decades. 
While the literature that has emerged since the Brundtland Report has contributed to the 
understanding and application of sustainable development, these documents have not altered 
its basic understanding.  In essence, the concept of sustainable development remains 
concerned principally with the following three matters: 
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 economic – the perspective of resource development; 
 ecological – the perspective of environmental protection; 
 social – the perspective of conservation for present and future human 
needs.
26
 
B. Human dignity 
Human dignity is understood as an ‘eclectic and ambiguous notion’27 that represents an 
amalgam of several main historical developments.
28
  During classical Roman times – when 
the concept is said to have emerged – the term dignitas hominis (or simply dignitas) referred 
to an individual’s status.29  This entitled an individual to respect and honour.30 
Dignitas was also used to refer to a second, broader (and, for current purposes, more 
relevant) concept that related to the inherent dignity of humans.  In this sense, the term 
dignitas was used to reflect humankind’s elevation above animals because animals were 
concerned only with ‘bodily satisfactions … Man’s mind, on the contrary, is developed by 
study and reflection’.31  The term dignitas therefore distinguished humans from other living 
species.  This approach also reflected the need for humans to consider ‘nature and [the] 
organization of the universe and one’s place in it’.32  The introspective philosophical 
approach subsequently led scholars to offer religious, humanist, moral and anthropological 
views about the meaning of human dignity and the role of humans within the universe.
33
 
The religious interpretation of human dignity was informed by the distinction between 
‘Man from beast’.  This approach held that ‘humans are made in the image of God and 
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[because] God became human, all humans have dignity’.34  During the period of the 
Renaissance, rationality and reason were concepts that came to be considered as being 
synonymous with the concept of dignity.
35
  The ‘root of Man’s dignity’36 was considered to 
be ‘his ability to choose to be what he wants to be based on reason, and that is a gift from 
God’.37 
The concept of human dignity was explored further during the period of the 
Enlightenment.  The approach adopted during this period held that, rather than God being the 
reason for human dignity, dignity is associated with the concept of free will.  This approach 
reflected that human dignity relates to ‘man’s autonomy, his capacity to be lord of his fate 
and the shaper of his future’.38  This approach is often cited as the philosophical basis for 
human dignity and for its incorporation into various documents concerning the law of 
international human rights.
39
 
Despite the importance of the religious and philosophical approaches to human dignity, 
this concept did not receive popular attention until its incorporation within the discourse of 
political philosophy that occurred during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  During the 
French Revolution, for example, ‘dignities’ – used in the sense of privileges that were 
afforded only to the aristocratic class – were provided to all citizens.  This meant that all 
citizens were ‘equally eligible to all public dignities ... without other distinction than that of 
their virtues and talents’.40  This formulation of human dignity subsequently became 
synonymous with a variety of social and political movements that advocated specific types of 
social reform.
41
  For example, human dignity informed the movements that were concerned 
with the promotion of the concept of equality, the abolition of slavery and the improvement 
of labour, social and living conditions.
42
  Despite the different subject matters, the common 
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thread among these modern political approaches to human dignity was the recognition of the 
inherent value of human beings and their entitlement to certain and fundamental rights that 
operate as the basis for a dignified life.
43
 
Based on the philosophical and political approaches, human dignity is considered to 
have strong moral implications that affect the operation of political life and human 
relations.
44
  It is for this reason that scholars have noted that dignity represents an ‘objective 
and intrinsic value’45 of humans.  Therefore, when one speaks of human dignity, one refers 
to: 
a value and intrinsic goodness greater than, and different from, a modest aesthetic 
value ... When we speak of human dignity, we speak of [a] morally relevant value, 
one which evidently imposes on us a moral call and an obligation to respect it.
46
 
On this view, human dignity is non-relational.
47
  It ‘endows each person with an intrinsic and 
objective preciousness’48 that emerges from the context in which the concept is considered.   
In the modern context, human dignity therefore provides individuals with the basis on 
which individuals can claim rights and have those rights recognised, protected and promoted.  
The recognition of this approach is evident in a number of international human rights 
documents, including the Charter of the United Nations,
49
 the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,
50
 and the two human rights covenants from 1966 – the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights
51
 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.
52
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While the incorporation of human dignity within the framework of international human 
rights law reflects its relevance to the recognition and protection of the intrinsic value of 
humankind, its historical evolution indicates that this concept is relatively opaque.  For this 
reason, scholars have suggested that it is useful to consider human dignity as a set of complex 
ideas with a ‘basic minimum content’.53  These are represented by the following three pillars: 
 [The first is that] every human being possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by 
being human. 
 The second is that this intrinsic worth should be recognized and respected 
by others, and some forms of treatment by others are inconsistent with, or 
required by, respect for this intrinsic worth ... 
 [The] third element [recognises that] ... the intrinsic worth of the individual 
requires that the state should be seen to exist for the sake of the individual 
human being, and not vice versa.
54
 
While the assessment of the concept of human dignity stops short of exploring its 
intricacies and its applications in different fora (particularly in the modern context), this 
overview offers an understanding of its core content.  Together with the assessment of 
sustainable development, the overview of human dignity provides us with sufficient context 
to consider the convergence of these concepts within the forum of international 
environmental law.  This overview also provides the context for a right to sustainable energy, 
as such a right represents the natural evolution of the emerging relationship between 
sustainable development and human dignity. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN 
DIGNITY 
The relationship between human dignity and sustainable development is well 
established in international environmental law.  This relationship was initially identified in 
the Stockholm Declaration.  Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration affirmed that ‘[m]an 
has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being’.55  The reference to a 
‘life of dignity’ recognises that ‘an environment of a particular quality is necessary for a man 
                                                 
53
 McCrudden, above n 29, p 679. 
54
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to enjoy his fundamental rights to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life’.56  In 
other words, the Stockholm Declaration recognised that the protection of the environment is 
essential for humans to have their intrinsic worth – their dignity – recognised and respected. 
After the Stockholm Declaration, it took 20 years for the relationship between human 
dignity and sustainable development to be revisited formally within the framework of 
international environmental law.  This observation does not suggest that the emerging content 
of international environmental law ignored the relationship between dignity and sustainable 
development in the intervening years.  Rather, it suggests that for a number of years the 
relationship between human dignity and sustainable development was expressed in more 
subtle terms.  For example, Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration proclaimed that humans ‘are 
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature’.57  When considered in the 
context of the broader objects of sustainable development, one can suggest that to live a 
‘healthy and productive life’ humans must first have their intrinsic worth recognised.  
However, unlike the approach of the Stockholm Declaration that recognised the relationship 
between dignity and sustainable development in express terms, the statement in the Rio 
Declaration merely inferred the existence of such a relationship.  A similar approach was 
adopted in other documents, including in the Brundtland Report and in the programme of 
action that was published following the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development that was held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro.
58
 
The concept of human dignity was revisited in a formal sense within the context of 
sustainable development and international environmental law during the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development
59
 and its accompanying Declaration: the Johannesburg 
Declaration.  In one of its initial remarks, the Johannesburg Declaration noted that the 
governments that participated in the Johannesburg Summit were committed to ‘building a 
humane, equitable and caring global society, cognizant of the need for human dignity for 
all’.60  In addition to the general recognition of human dignity, the Johannesburg Declaration 
also identified the relevance of human dignity within the context of a number of specific 
issues concerning sustainable development.  This was evident in Article 18 of the 
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Johannesburg Declaration.  This article noted that the governments that participated in the 
Johannesburg Summit ‘welcome[d] the focus ... on the indivisibility of human dignity’61 as 
this would enable greater ‘access to such basic requirements as clean water, sanitation, 
adequate shelter, energy, health care, food security and the protection of biodiversity’.62 
Paragraph 18 of the Johannesburg Declaration represented an important milestone in 
the convergence of the concept of human dignity and sustainable development.  This article 
formally recognised that to have one’s dignity recognised and promoted it was necessary to 
provide such basic requirements as clean water, sanitation and energy.  The provision of such 
basic requirements would then contribute to the achievement of sustainable development, as 
the access to such basic requirements would contribute directly to the eradication of poverty.  
Therefore, paragraph 18 of the Johannesburg Declaration recognised specifically that the 
protection and promotion of human dignity could contribute to the achievement of 
sustainable development.  In this sense, the Johannesburg Declaration not only reaffirmed the 
relationship that was originally identified in the Stockholm Declaration and developed 
implicitly in the years following the Stockholm Summit, but it also recognised that human 
dignity and sustainable development are inherently interdependent and complementary 
concepts. 
The recognition of the interdependence of human dignity and sustainable development 
was considered further in the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development.
63
  This relationship was considered specifically in the context of the role that 
energy could play in eradicating poverty and contributing to more sustainable patterns of 
energy consumption and production.
64
  In relation to the issue of poverty, the Plan of 
Implementation recognised that access to sustainable energy represented ‘an indispensable 
requirement for sustainable development’.65  In this regard, the Plan of Implementation called 
for all levels of government to: 
improve access to reliable and affordable energy services for sustainable development 
sufficient to facilitate the achievement of the Millennium development goals, 
including the goal of halving the proportion of people in poverty by 2015, and as a 
                                                 
61
 Ibid, para 18. 
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means to generate other important services that mitigate poverty, bearing in mind that 
access to energy facilitates the eradication of poverty.
66
 
To achieve this objective, the Plan of Implementation suggested that it would be 
necessary to provide ‘access to reliable, affordable, economically viable, socially acceptable 
and environmentally sound energy services and resources’.67  A similar approach would also 
be required to address the unsustainable patterns of energy consumption and production.  In 
this regard, the Plan of Implementation noted that it would be prudent to ‘develop and 
disseminate alternative energy technologies, with the aim of giving a greater share of the 
energy mix to renewable energies’.68  Therefore, the Plan of Implementation recognised that 
to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development while promoting the intrinsic 
worth of humans, it would be necessary to move beyond the traditional fossil fuel-based 
sources of energy and accelerate the deployment of energy sources that do not undermine the 
Earth’s ecosystem. 
The approach that was posited by the Johannesburg Declaration and the Plan of 
Implementation represented an extension of the approach that was elicited by the Stockholm 
Declaration.  However, unlike the approach from 1972, the documents that were delivered 
during and after the Johannesburg Summit revealed that to address the challenges relating to 
the poverty-energy-environment nexus it would be necessary to recognise the intrinsic worth 
of humans.  This is because, it is only by recognising and protecting the worth of humans – 
which is achieved by providing them with the requirements for a dignified life – that 
sustainable development is able to address the matters required to eradicate poverty and 
provide for more sustainable patterns of energy production.
69
 
While the extension of the relationship between human dignity, poverty and energy 
represents an important point in the development of international environmental law, from a 
practical perspective the convergence of these issues has had little effect.  This conclusion is 
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premised on the reality that more than 1.4 billion humans continue to live in poverty
70
 while 
more than 80 per cent of the world’s energy continues to be sourced from fossil fuels.71  The 
prevalence of these issues is the reason why the United Nations chose to declare 2012 as the 
‘International Year of Sustainable Energy for All’.72  It is also the reason why one of the 
principal themes of Rio+20 was to address the concept of ‘a green economy in the context of 
sustainable development and poverty’.73 
It is within this context that the remainder of this paper considers how a right to 
sustainable energy can contribute to an international legal framework that is designed to 
address some of the challenges relating to the poverty-energy-environment nexus. 
TOWARDS A RIGHT TO SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 
A. The relationship between human rights and international environmental law 
Using a rights-based approach to encourage more sustainable patterns of energy 
production reflects a departure from the traditional structure of international environmental 
law.  It also reflects a departure from the traditional approach that is used to conceptualise 
and apply the law of human rights. 
Traditionally, international environmental law has been designed to address matters that 
are of a communal nature, such as water scarcity, environmental degradation and, most 
recently, climate change.  In this sense, international environmental law has traditionally been 
concerned with the management of the course of events in a social system.
74
  On the other 
hand, the traditional approach to human rights law is concerned with the imposition of 
individual sanctions and the protection of individual rights.
75
  On this basis, it would seem 
that a right to sustainable energy, which seeks to operate at the intersection of human rights 
and international environmental law, would not fit neatly within one of these disciplines. 
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However, such a view ignores the evolution of the relationship between international 
environmental law and the law of human rights.  As a result, the traditional view of these 
legal disciplines now oversimplifies the reality of their interaction.
76
  For this reason, rather 
than being considered to operate at two ends of the legal spectrum, the Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights
77
 has suggested that ‘[h]uman rights obligations and 
commitments have the potential to inform and strengthen international, regional and national 
policymaking in the area of environmental protection’.78   
On the basis of this integrated view, the OHCHR has identified three approaches to the 
relationship between human rights and international environmental law.  These approaches 
‘are capable of coexisting and do not necessarily exclude one another’.79  The first approach 
‘postulates that the environment is a precondition to the enjoyment of human rights [and] ... 
underscores the fact that life and human dignity are only possible where people have access 
to an environment with certain basic qualities’.80  The former Vice-President of the 
International Court of Justice, Justice Weeramantry, underscored this point when he noted 
that: 
the protection of the environment is ... a vital part of contemporary human rights 
doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health 
and the right to life itself.  It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this, as damage to 
the environment can impair and undermine all the human rights spoken of in the 
Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments.
81
 
The second approach views human rights as ‘tools to address environmental issues, 
both procedurally and substantively’.82  The third approach recognises the ‘integration of 
human rights and the environment under the concept of sustainable development’.83  This 
approach requires the integration of economic, environmental and social justice issues’84 
within the context of sustainable development. 
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Notwithstanding the evolution of the relationship between human rights and sustainable 
development, the basis of this relationship is being challenged by the emergence of the 
concept of the ‘green economy’.  This concept has only emerged within the past decade.  
However, its emergence has been so profound that one of the principal objects of Rio+20 was 
to consider the role of ‘a green economy in the context of sustainable development and 
poverty eradication’.85 
The United Nations Environmental Program has described the concept of the green 
economy as an economy that is 
low-carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive.  In a green economy, growth in 
income and employment are driven by public and private investments that reduce 
carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent 
the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services ... The key aim for a transition to a 
green economy is to enable economic growth and investment while increasing 
environmental quality and social inclusiveness.
86
 
In this respect, the concept of the green economy ‘is compatible with the older concept of 
sustainable development that has been mainstreamed into the United Nations’ work for 
decades’.87 
However, the tension that arises between the concept of the green economy and the 
relationship between sustainable development and the law of human rights is that the former  
entails risks and challenges, particularly for developing countries, for whom 
economic development becomes more demanding and the fear arises that the new 
concept [of the green economy] could be used to reinforce protectionist trends, 
enhance the conditionality associated with international financial cooperation, and 
unleash new forces that would reinforce international inequalities.
88
 
Put differently, the concept of the green economy risks undermining the recognition and 
protection of fundamental human rights if it fails to recognise the different application of 
sustainable development in developed and developing nations. 
This tension is particularly pronounced in relation to the issue of energy.  The reason 
for this is that without energy, development and the corresponding recognition of basic 
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human rights is not possible.  However, if the energy that is required to support development 
is sourced from unsustainable sources, then this will contribute to outcomes where other basic 
rights (such as a right to a healthy environment) are not adequately recognised or protected.  
For this reason, the application of the concept of the green economy requires careful thought 
based on the context in which it is applied. 
Therefore, in order for the concept of the green economy to support the pursuit of 
sustainable development, the recognition of human rights and, more particularly, a right to 
sustainable energy, it must address the ‘tradeoffs that may be involved at different stages of 
development and with different environment endowments and challenges’.89  To manage 
these tradeoffs, a three-pronged approach has been suggested.
90
  This approach requires that 
developed countries ... take the lead in changing their production and consumption 
patterns; developing countries maintain their development goals but do so while 
adopting sustainable practices; and developed countries commit to enable and support 
the developing countries’ sustainable development through finance, technology 
transfer and appropriate reforms to the global economic and financial structures.
91
 
By adopting such a nuanced approach, the pursuit of a green economy within the context of 
sustainable development can operate to enhance further the existing relationship between 
human rights and international environmental law and, more particularly for this paper, can 
also contribute to the sustainable production of energy. 
B. The benefit of a right to sustainable energy 
Considered within the modern context, a right to sustainable energy that is designed to 
operate in conjunction with existing international environmental laws offers two principal 
benefits.  The first relates to the ability of an individual to invoke the right and demand it of a 
state.
92
  The second benefit extends beyond formal obligations on the state and concerns the 
recognition of the right in the context of interpreting and designing legal rules. 
A right to sustainable energy could entitle its beneficiary to seek the recognition, 
protection and promotion of this right.  To do so, a corresponding obligation (or duty) would 
need to be created.  Such a duty would compel those that are bound by it to limit their actions 
so as not to breach the corresponding right.  It would also compel these actors to undertake 
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specific actions to ensure that the corresponding right can be fulfilled.  If a duty were 
breached, the beneficiary of the right would be entitled to bring legal proceedings.  Given that 
under the law of international human rights a right is conferred on an individual, it would be 
the individual that is the beneficiary of a right to sustainable energy while the corresponding 
duty would rest with the state.
93
  Therefore, failure by a state to comply with its duty would 
generally entitle a victim to invoke the right and demand it of the state.
94
 
The second benefit of a right to sustainable energy extends beyond the issue of legal 
enforceability, as rights are not solely concerned with ‘conferring rights enforceable by legal 
proceedings’.95  Rights may also be used to ‘ascribe value or status to the interests and claims 
of particular entities’.96  In this regard, rights can encourage 
law-makers and institutions to take account of those interests, to accord them priority 
which they might not otherwise enjoy and to make them part of the context for 
interpreting legal rules.
97
   
Considered in the context of international law, whether a right is justiciable will not be 
determinative of whether that right has any impact.
98
  This is because the mere recognition of 
a right can provide a ‘focus for efforts at both the national and international level to bring 
pressure to bear on states to fulfil their responsibilities to citizens’.99  Therefore, the 
recognition of a right to sustainable energy may, even if it is not immediately capable of 
judicial enforcement, raise the awareness of the issues with which the right is concerned. 
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Consequently, the proclamation of a right to sustainable energy could, if designed 
appropriately, potentially provide for a justiciable right.  This could provide victims with an 
immediate opportunity to have that right recognised, protected and promoted.  However, even 
to the extent that such a right were not immediately justiciable, the recognition of a right to 
sustainable energy would still operate to raise awareness of the issues with which the right is 
concerned and to encourage states to make it part of the context for interpreting and 
designing legal rules.  In this regard, a right to sustainable energy provides new opportunities 
to enhance the production practices of energy that currently undermine the achievement of 
sustainable development. 
Given that a right to sustainable energy offers some benefits to contribute to the 
achievement of sustainable development, the questions that arise are: (i) how might a right to 
sustainable energy be formulated within the framework of international law? and (ii) what 
would such a right entail?  Let us address these questions in turn. 
A. The forum for a right to sustainable energy 
There are arguably only a few mechanisms through which a right to sustainable energy 
can be recognised within the framework of international law.
100
  First, such a right might 
emerge under customary international law, as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law’.101  Second, a right to sustainable energy might be able to be derived from the existing 
law of international human rights.  Third, such a right could be formally recognised in a 
covenant.
102
  Finally, a right to sustainable energy could also be recognised by being included 
in a soft law instrument. 
Soft law instruments refer to instruments that are not legally binding per se but that 
nonetheless influence the direction of international law.
103
  Such instruments include 
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, guidelines of international organisations 
and statements of principles.  In this regard, Sands has noted that soft law instruments ‘point 
to the likely future direction of formally binding obligations, by informally establishing 
acceptable norms of behaviour’.104 
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a. Customary international law 
Customary international law is derived from legal custom that is evidenced by state 
practice.
105
  Legal customs crystallise into international law ‘only if accompanied by a 
subjective belief on the part of the state concerned that it is under a legal obligation to 
conform to the custom’.106  This belief usually only occurs after an extended period of time 
during which time the practice ‘is so widely and consistently followed that the necessary 
sense of obligation (the opinio juris) is apparent and established’.107  Such practices may be 
recorded in the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, state statutes, 
international fora, statements from intergovernmental bodies, public statements of policy and 
judicial decisions.
108
  However, in a ‘world of diverse cultures, policies, interests and legal 
systems’109 it has been noted that is particularly difficult to identify universal practices 
sufficient to recognise customary international law.
110
 
While customary international law offers an opportunity to recognise the right to 
sustainable energy, relying on such an approach may not be particularly useful.  While there 
is growing documentary evidence of the need to develop energy production practices that are 
more sustainable, the recognition of the importance of energy and, more particularly, 
sustainable energy, is relatively novel.  In fact, as Bradbrook and Gardam have suggested, 
‘[i]n world fora relating to sustainable development, energy [has] lagged behind many other 
... issues’.111  Energy has only ‘reached center stage’112 in the context of sustainable 
development and international environmental law since the ‘deliberations at and leading up to 
the ninth session of the Commission on Sustainable Development’113 and the Johannesburg 
Summit in 2002. 
Further, because of the ‘urgent, widely varied, and dynamic’114 issues concerning the 
production of sustainable energy, it is suggested that these issues ‘would not be adequately 
addressed by a broad international legal norm which would require years to establish’.115  
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Therefore, the right to sustainable energy does not appear to be particularly well suited to 
recognition within the forum of customary international law.  
b. An inferred right to sustainable energy 
The second approach that may lead to the recognition of a right to sustainable energy 
involves inferring such a right from the existing legal framework governing international 
human rights.  The application of this approach would not create a new right per se; it would 
merely recognise that such a right exists by virtue of its relevance to other, existing rights.  
Such an approach might work for a right to sustainable energy as this right is well grounded 
in the current law of international human rights.  The right to sustainable energy is related to 
a number of rights that are contained in the ICESCR.
116
  For example, the right to an 
adequate standard of living,
117
 the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health
118
 and the right to work,
119
 each rely on the availability of affordable and 
sufficient energy.  The relevance of sustainable energy can also be observed in other 
international human right law documents, including the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child
120
 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
121
  
Therefore, the right to sustainable energy can be inferred from the context of existing human 
rights law. 
While the importance of energy can be identified from within the framework of existing 
international law, recognising a right to sustainable energy in this manner has its limitations.  
Arguably, its greatest limitation is that inferring such a right merely creates an interpreted 
right.  Therefore, such a right would carry ‘neither the clout nor the binding legal status 
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necessary’122 for its effective enforcement in the international setting.  Consequently, the 
creation of an inferred right to sustainable energy is not suitable for a matter that is 
desperately urgent to address matters relating to human poverty and the future of the Earth’s 
ecosystem. 
c. A treaty guaranteeing the right to sustainable energy 
The third approach that could be used to create a right to sustainable energy involves 
the creation of a treaty that is designed specifically to guarantee this right.  Such an approach 
seems eminently more sensible than the two aforementioned approaches as its creation could 
(at least if consensus could be reached about its design) occur quickly and without the need to 
infer it from the existence of other rights.  Importantly, a treaty that is designed specifically to 
guarantee a right to sustainable energy would give this right an independent legal status and, 
as a result, would provide legal recourse for the beneficiaries of the right.
123
 
While a treaty that is concerned specifically with guaranteeing a right to sustainable 
energy might seem appropriate, it is useful to consider why such a treaty has not yet emerged 
if it represents the most robust approach.  One of the most obvious reasons for this is that 
there is little consensus about what course of action is required to recognise, protect and 
promote a right to sustainable energy.  This is because states in the developed world consider 
issues relating to energy principally through the lens of greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
while those from the developing world view energy as a fundamental tool to eradicate 
poverty.
124
  These different interpretations consequently lead to different strategic responses.  
Further, even if agreement could be reached in relation to these issues, matters relating to 
energy, environmental protection and climate change have proven to be vexed issues where 
little consensus exists within international fora.
125
  Therefore, a treaty that relies on a rigid 
framework and that requires broad international consensus does not appear to offer a practical 
approach to address the dynamic, complex and urgent matters required to guarantee a right to 
sustainable energy, at least not in a timely fashion.
126
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d. The use of a soft law instrument to promote a right to sustainable energy 
The final approach that may be adopted to create a right to sustainable energy relies on 
a soft law instrument that promotes this right.  Unlike the other approaches, there are no 
guidelines that describe how soft law is to be created or the form that such law should take.  
Soft law instruments can range from resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, 
guidelines of international organisations, statements of principles, resolutions of international 
conferences of states, codes of conduct or declarations of international organisations.  
Therefore, the forum of international soft law provides great flexibility to create the 
foundations for a right to sustainable energy. 
Soft law instruments ‘are particularly useful when the subject in question is one about 
which there may be considerable difficulty in reaching consensus amongst states’.127  
Addressing the unsustainable approach to energy production and poverty reflects such issues.  
For this reason, it is suggested that the most appropriate approach to formulate a right to 
sustainable energy is to develop a soft law instrument that recognises and promotes this right.  
Such an approach could provide ‘a flexible framework allowing states to feel comfortable 
working within its terms [and] is [therefore] far more likely to achieve some real 
outcomes’128 rather than a rigid treaty that is unlikely to yield broad consensus.  Therefore, an 
appropriately drafted soft law document could represent the basis for a right to sustainable 
energy. 
A soft law instrument that is concerned with creating a right to sustainable energy could 
take the form of an informal document, such as a code of conduct or an action plan.  
Alternatively, a soft law instrument could be drafted so that it is presented in a more formal 
setting, such as in a declaration.  This paper suggests that because a right to sustainable 
energy has not been considered at any length, it would be most appropriate to adopt an 
informal approach.  Such an approach could be combined with the initiatives that are 
suggested in response to the United Nations’ Sustainable Energy for All initiative.129  More 
importantly, such an approach could provide the basis for future work to formalise the right 
to sustainable energy so that it may eventually form part of the formal international legal 
framework. 
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B. Content of a right to sustainable energy 
A legal right to sustainable energy must ensure that there is access on the basis of 
equality and without any discrimination to ‘reliable, affordable, economically viable, socially 
acceptable and environmentally sound’130 energy that is sufficient to sustain those services 
and amenities (including the environment) that are required to live a dignified life.
131
  
Therefore, to be effective a right to sustainable energy must address a number of issues that 
are context specific. 
For example, issues relating to ‘sufficiency’, ‘economic viability’ and ‘affordability’ 
are matters that cannot be readily defined, as they will mean different things when considered 
in different contexts.  The amount of energy that is required to be made available will depend 
on the needs of individuals within a particular economy.  For this reason, rather than offering 
a very specific definition in each context, it is more important that a soft law instrument be 
concerned with the fundamental matters with which each issue is concerned.  Therefore, in 
the case of ‘sufficiency’, an instrument must provide that supply must be able to meet the 
‘primary needs of the community it ... serve[s]’.132  For affordability, which represents one of 
the major obstacles to implementing such a right, it is critical that the right requires that states 
identify and then work to negate the financial barriers that limit the affordability of energy.
133
  
In this regard, it is critical that any document that purports to support a right to sustainable 
energy must be practical and be cognisant of the different contexts in which such a right may 
apply. 
A right to sustainable energy must also define what is meant by the concept of 
‘environmentally sound’ energy.  The Plan of Implementation suggested that the term 
‘environmentally sound’ means that there must be an emphasis on reducing our reliance on 
fossil fuels to generate energy and, in its place, give ‘a greater share of the energy mix to 
renewable energies’.134  The vision statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
which contains the objects of the ‘Sustainable Energy for All’ initiative, expanded on this 
statement by noting that to ‘underpin the goal of achieving sustainable energy for all, by 
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2030’135 there must be double ‘the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix’136 
based on current total energy production.  This requires that by 2030, approximately 30 per 
cent of the world’s energy will need to be sourced from renewable sources.137  Therefore, 
while it might appear trite, it is nonetheless critical that a right to sustainable energy 
recognises the importance of increasing the use of renewable sources to produce energy.
138
  If 
possible, it would also be beneficial for such a document to put forward a medium and long-
term goal that relates to increasing the use of renewable sources to produce energy. 
However, merely noting that renewable sources of energy are environmentally sound is 
not sufficient.  This is because not all renewable energy sources are environmentally benign.  
Therefore, not all renewable sources contribute to the achievement of sustainable 
development.  For example, hydropower facilities (which rely on water to produce energy) 
rely on a renewable resource.  However, hydropower facilities can have ‘potentially large 
environmental impacts’.139  These facilities can ‘affect the hydrology of freshwater systems, 
obstruct upstream and downstream migration, and change the water flow and sediments’.140  
In this regard, a definition of environmentally sound energy sources must also consider the 
ecological impacts of various renewable sources to ensure that their impact does not 
undermine the achievement of sustainable development. 
This discussion does not represent a definitive assessment of what is required to prepare 
a soft law instrument that is concerned with developing a right to sustainable energy.  Clearly 
much more work is required to fashion a right to sustainable energy, even within the 
relatively informal nature of an international soft law document.  To do so would require 
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input from various actors, including from the beneficiaries of such a right and from states that 
would be obliged to recognise, protect and promote this right.
141
  This paper has merely 
sought to contribute to the discourse on this matter by identifying some of the most critical 
issues in this regard. 
CONCLUSION 
Energy represents the cornerstone of modern life.  It allows society to function, 
produce, invent and develop.  It is also the fundamental ingredient for a dignified life, as it is 
the source of such basic human requirements as cooked food, a comfortable living 
temperature and essential health care.  Somewhat ironically, however, humankind’s 
overreliance on fossil fuels for energy means that the production of energy is undermining the 
livelihood of the Earth’s ecosystem.  This delicately nuanced approach has been recognised 
by international environmental law. 
While the convergence of human dignity and sustainable development represented an 
important milestone in the maturation of international environmental law, this approach has 
proven insufficient to address the challenges posed by the poverty-energy-environment 
nexus.  1.4 billion continue to live in poverty, economic turmoil is undermining the ongoing 
development of the global economy and the warming of the Earth’s climate is threatening the 
future prosperity of its ecosystem.  It is for these reasons that this paper has suggested that it 
is timely to develop a right to sustainable energy in order to encourage more sustainable 
patterns of energy production.  While the creation of such a right might represent a departure 
from the traditional approach existing under international environmental law, such a right 
furthers the convergence of sustainable development and human dignity.  
To be clear, a right to sustainable energy would not replace the existing approaches 
concerning energy, poverty and the environment that exist within the framework of 
international environmental law; it would be designed to complement the existing approach.  
Therefore, the promotion of a right to sustainable energy does not advocate an 
anthropocentric approach to environmental protection or to sustainable development, more 
generally.  While suggesting that a right to sustainable energy can contribute to the more 
sustainable patterns of energy production, this paper recognises that matters concerning the 
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environment ‘encompass a much wider range of actors, affecting a much larger category of 
species than human rights violations’.142 
While this paper offers an approach to further encourage the sustainable production of 
energy, it does not purport to provide the answers to some of the most dynamic and complex 
issues threatening the sustainable existence of the Earth and its many and varied inhabitants.  
Rather, this paper has merely sought to recognise the inability of the current international 
legal framework to address the challenges posed by the poverty-energy-environment nexus.   
This paper has suggested that a right to sustainable energy may be able to contribute to 
a solution to these challenges in a practical and meaningful way.  Such an approach would 
also represent a natural evolution of the sentiments first enunciated in the Stockholm 
Declaration and carried forward to the Johannesburg Declaration and, more recently, at 
Rio+20 relating to the fundamental relationship between human dignity and sustainable 
development.  More importantly, such an approach would also contribute to the eradication 
of poverty and the protection of the Earth’s ecosystem by better managing the Earth’s 
resources for the benefit of its human and non-human inhabitants.  In this sense, the formal 
convergence of human dignity and sustainable development offers a tremendous opportunity 
to address many of the world’s most fundamental and persistent problems. 
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